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The "eternal and necessary bond between Philosophy and Physics"
"The "eternal and necessary bond between Philosophy and Physics"" belongs to Grant's nature-philosophy line, where Schelling, world, and transcendental speculation reframe the archive through cosmology rather than cybernetic meltdown.
Archive condition
The page uses the canonical extracted text as its reading layer while preserving the original file paths as the archival source of record.
Core idea
These pages matter because they give the archive a different philosophical afterlife from Brassier's rationalist critique. Grant reopens nature, world, and Schelling as live speculative resources rather than treating modernity as exhausted by capital or nihilism.
The mechanism is transcendental and cosmological at once. Nature is treated as productive, self-differentiating, and conceptually generative, so philosophy becomes a way of tracking world-process rather than merely critiquing representation.
That matters because the site needs to distinguish Grant's nature philosophy from both CCRU accelerationism and speculative-realist branding. This cluster keeps visible a cosmological branch of the afterlife that would otherwise be flattened into generic realism.
How to read this text
Read first for how nature or world is being defined before moving into the denser speculative vocabulary around it.
Track where Schelling, cosmology, or transcendental argument stop being historical reference and become live conceptual machinery.
Representative extracts
Definition · paragraph 13
As Schelling put it in the Journal, ‘‘the naturephilosopher puts himself in the place of nature’’ (Schelling 2001, 192): this is not to be understood as the transfer of intelligence, but as the motions of its physical precursors. notes 1 In the Exposition of the True Relation of Naturephilosophy to the Improved Fichtean Theory (1806), Schelling writes:‘‘Above all, the true signifi- cance of the eternal and necessary bond between philosophy and physics remains a mystery even in our time’’ (SW VII:101).
Definition · paragraph 9
Having, as Schelling advises, ‘‘set aside all practical admixture’’ (SW IV: 86) in order to properly diagram Fichte’s transcendental animality, or biocentric naturephilosophy, as a two-worlds antiphysics, and before proceeding to differentiate the Schellingian from the Fichtean naturephilosophy, we will turn to one amongst many instances of neo-Fichteanism.
Definition · paragraph 12
Indeed, the argu- ments around which this exchange of two articles – Eschenmayer’s ‘‘Spontaneity ¼ Worldsoul’’ and Schelling’s ‘‘On the true concept of nature- philosophy’’ – is constructed continue to divide these tendencies, as we have seen, into the contemporary.
Definition · paragraph 12
Here, in list form, is the core of Eschenmayer’s argument (Schelling 2001, 233–34): 1. Naturephilosophy problematises, but cannot resolve, the nature of the ‘‘connection between nature and concept, law and freedom, dead mechanism and vital dynamics.’’ 2.
Definition · paragraph 12
We cannot agree with Hegel’s judgement that ‘‘Schelling’s answer to Eschenmayer’s idealistic objections against the Naturphilosophie’’ (1977a, 79) fails to bring into sharp relief the dif- ference between the Schellingianising and Fich- teanising tendencies in the philosophy of nature (not least in Hegel’s own).
Appears in sections
Brassier, Grant, and Speculative Realism Primary section
Analytic and speculative receptions of Land and the CCRU through Brassier, Grant, and adjacent philosophical lines.